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  Abstract: This paper presents some aspects regarding competition and 
harmonization in European Union fiscal policy, especially after the last 
enlargement on 2007.  The problem of tax harmonization is connected with 
tax competition in the context of increasing capital mobility between 
different countries. Using a panel data for EU countries, analyzed on 1995-
2004, we find significant correlations between the implicit tax rate of 
business income and corporation profits and the budget deficit, public 
debt, GDP per capita and the degree of openness of countries, the last 
variable is used as a proxy for capital mobility. 
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1. Introduction  
The European Union is a consequence of the integration efforts of its members. 
The European Community is based on the rule that competition should be a mechanism 
to allocate the economic resources (Article 98 of the EC Treaty). This rule is central to 
the European project since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. So the uniform conditions 
should be secured for all competitors in the European market. Following this argument, 
tax rules should not hamper the free movement of goods, services (including freedom 
of establishments), labour and capital. Or in the other words as far as taxation is 
concerned, distortion through the tax system, including tax expenditures should be 
eliminated. This leads to tax systems’ integration. However this argument doesn’t 
justify the form of tax integration either through tax harmonization or through tax 
competition. 
The European Court of Justice has ruled that direct taxes fall within the 
competence of EU member states, however, member states must implement this 
competence without infringing the law of the European Community. 
At present, the VAT and excise duties are harmonized across the EU. Proposals 
to harmonize the corporate tax system, expressed for the first time in the Neumark 
Report in 1962, have been widely discussed until today and can be viewed as a centre-
piece discussion among EU countries.  
The continuous debates show that countries and their representatives differently 
perceive what tax harmonization is. Some consider it as a complete harmonization of 
the entire tax (consolidation of a base, rate and rules of payment at a single stage), 
while others see it also as harmonization of separate fragments of taxation (only the 
base, the rate, etc.).   
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The process of tax integration over last 15-20 years was not linear. Some 
countries introduced some distortional solutions in their tax systems. And process of 
solving such distortions led to tax integration.  
The EU also promote some measures against harmful tax competition for 
reduce distortions to the single market; prevent significant losses of tax revenue; and 
reverse the trend of an increasing tax burden on labor as compared to more mobile tax 
bases. 
2. Aspects regarding the EU fiscal policy  
The EU it can be considered as a whole, a high tax area. In 2005, the last year 
for which detailed tax data are available, the total tax ratio in the EU-27 amounted to 
39.6 % about 13 percentage points of GDP above those recorded in the United States 
and Japan.
15 
But not all EU Member States individually display high tax ratios; there are 
wide differences in tax levels across the Union. Eight Member States display overall tax 
ratios below the 35 % mark, and the overall tax ratio ranges over more than twenty 
points of GDP, from 51.3 % in Sweden to merely 28.0 % in Romania.  This band 
reflects the significant differences in the role played by the State within the Member 
States.  
As a general rule tax-to-GDP ratios tend to be significantly higher in the "old" 
EU- 15 than in the 12 new Member States that joined the Union since 2004, but there 
are exceptions; for example, Ireland's overall tax ratio is over six points below the EU-
27 average, while Slovenia and Hungary's exceed it.  
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Source: Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Figure no. 1 Total taxes (including social contributions)to GDP for UE member 
states,  2005  
Therefore, the recourse to direct taxes, which are more 'visible' to the 
electorate, tends to be greater in the countries where tax redistribution objectives are 
more pronounced (like EU-15); this usually results also in higher top personal income 
tax rates. Generally, the new Member States have a different structure compared to the 
                                                      
15 Eurostat, (2007), „Taxation Trends in the European Union”, European Commission, 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat  
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EU-15 countries; while most old Member States raise roughly equal shares of revenues 
from direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social contributions, the new Member states often 
display a substantially lower share of direct taxes on the total.  
 
Source: Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Figure no. 2 Structure of tax revenues by major type of taxes 2005, in % of the 
total tax burden 
The lowest shares of direct taxes are recorded in Bulgaria (merely 17.9 % of the 
total), Romania (19.1 %) and Poland (20.5 %); in the latter, the share of direct taxes has 
diminished by one third since 1995. One of the reasons for this difference can be found 
in the generally lower tax rates applied in the new Member States on corporate and 
personal income; as for progressivity, some of the new Member States have abandoned 
it almost completely by adopting flat tax systems (one example of this is Slovakia, 
Romania and Baltic’s countries). Amongst the old Member States, however, there are 
other interesting differences. The Nordic countries (i.e. Sweden, Denmark and Finland) 
rely primarily on direct taxation, whereas some southern countries (in particular, 
Portugal and Greece) have relatively high shares of indirect taxes. Denmark stands out 
in another respect; most welfare spending is financed out of general taxation instead of 
social contributions (only 2%); therefore, the share of direct taxation in total tax 
revenues in Denmark is in fact the highest in the Union, while social security revenue is 
very low. Germany shows the opposite pattern: it has the highest share of social 
contributions and the lowest share of direct tax revenues in the EU-15; a similar pattern 
is found in France.  
Since the second half of the 1990s, corporate income tax rates in Europe have 
been cut forcefully. The tendency has continued also in 2006, as shown by a 0.8 
percentage point drop in the EU-27 average. Although the downward trend has been 
quite general, corporate tax rates still vary substantially within the Union between a 
minimum of 10 % (in Bulgaria and Cyprus) to a maximum of 38.7 % in Germany. As 
in the case of the personal income tax, the lowest rates are typical of countries with low 
overall tax ratios; consequently, the new Member States typically figure as having low  
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rates (with the noteworthy exception of Malta, whose 35 % rate is the third highest in 
the Union).  
The reverse is, however, not true; unlike the case of the personal income tax, 
the two Member States with the highest overall tax-to-GDP ratios, i.e. Sweden and 
Denmark, display corporate tax rates that are not much above the average due to the 
adoption by these countries of Dual Income Tax systems, which by nature tax capital 




























 Source : KPMG International; http://www.worldwide-tax.com 
Figure no. 3 The Corporate Tax Rate, 2007 
Hence, the top positions in the ranking are occupied by Germany and Italy, 
whose overall tax ratios are not amongst the highest but traditionally impose relatively 
high corporate income tax rates. The German government has, however, recently 
announced a sizeable cut in the CIT. 
Consumption taxes on the rise in most Member States since 2001. The trend is 
particularly visible in the smaller Member States; several of these are new Member 
States, which in the last years have been increasing excise duties to conform to the EU 
minima.  
The larger Member States in contrast generally show slightly declining taxation 
of consumption. The trend towards higher taxation of consumption may, however, be at 
work also in the larger Member States, as highlighted by the hike in the standard 
German VAT rate by three points in 2007. 
Even the corporate tax rate is decreasing the effective corporate tax rate is not 
much lower because of broadening tax base cyclical factors. The EU tax policy is 
designated to assure the four freedom of the internal market for citizens and business 
and to reducing the economic distortions associated with national tax systems. 
3. Review of the literature 
Proposals to harmonize the tax system, expressed for the first time in the 
Neumark Report in 1962, have been widely discussed until today among EU countries. 
Sinn (1990) points out that though tax harmonization is needed to avoid distortions, it 
does not necessarily require centrally coordinated actions by European governments.   
  32 
Revista Tinerilor Economi ti 
There are two routes to integration: through harmonization and through 
competition (Kay, 1993). In the first of these approaches the creation of free trade 
requires prior alignment of the policies and practices of the states involved. Under the 
second the favored mechanism is to promote integration as rapidly as possible, and let 
the consequences for rules follow from that. Generally, the EU's role in taxation has 
been relatively minor, so far. The EU favors tax harmonization, but it has mainly 
confined itself to harmonization of indirect taxes.  
Frey and Eichenberger (1996) state that tax harmonization is normally 
advocated because it reduces economic distortions and tax competition because it 
reduces political distortions. 
Klaver and Timmermans (1999), however, question that tax competition will 
hurt the European welfare states. They argue that the rising tax burden on labor in a 
number of countries has more to do with their failure to make structural adjustments in 
the public sector and their traditionally low tax burden on capital than with excessive 
tax competition. While Krogstrup (2002) suggests that, while full-fledged 
harmonization is unnecessary, a tax floor would be advisable. 
On the other side the idea of tax competition is not new; it can be finding in the 
famous Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith. The debate on tax competition has started 
with the model developed by Tiebout (1956), which examines competition among 
governments over mobile households and it is assumed that households select the 
region according to their preferences for the mix of taxes and public expenditures 
through voting with their feet. Tiebout argues that competition for mobile households is 
welfare enhancing. Integration of Europe follows the conclusions from Tiebout model 
applied at the government level, which are competing for capital and for firms. 
In the literature are many points of views that try to reveal the fiscal externality 
generated by tax competition through the race of the bottom in tax rate and under 
provision of public goods in equilibrium like in basics models of tax competition 
developed by Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), and surveyed by Wilson 
(1999). This view is contrasting to the thinking of conservative policymakers and the 
Public Choice literature. 
  Brennan and Buchanan (1980), or McLure (1986) have argued that 
competition in general, and competition among governments in particular, is beneficial 
because it reduces government waste and disciplines politicians. If tax rates are cut in 
the process of competition, government expenditures have to be reduced; this helps to 
avoid waste and inefficiencies in the public sector. (Boss, 1999) 
 The views on tax competition are divided in two parts. There are the models 
where tax competition leads to inefficiently low taxes due to positive externalities, and 
reduces welfare, may support the notion that international cooperation between 
countries (i.e. like in the EU) can alleviate the downward pressure in tax rates and leave 
all countries better off. But there is also a whole group of models which reveal the 
positive effects of tax competition through reducing the inefficiency in government 
spending and stimulate the optimal ratio taxes-public goods for contributors which have 
the possibility to choose the jurisdiction which offer the best ratio. 
4. Tax Harmonization –a solution for EU fiscal policy? 
The 1987 proposal of the European Commission with regard to indirect taxes 
was based on a rather ambitious goal of tax harmonization. Though tax harmonization 
ensures an efficient international resource allocation within the private sector by  
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equalizing relative prices across borders, it does not ensure an efficient resource 
allocation between the private and the public sectors since it does not respect cross-
country differences in the preference for income redistribution (Hagen et al., 1998). 
Tax harmonization exists when taxpayers face similar or identical tax rates no 
matter where they work, save, shop, or invest. Tax harmonization can be achieved two 
different ways (Mitchel, 2004): 
- Explicit tax harmonization occurs when nations agree to set minimum tax 
rates or decide to tax at the same rate. The European Union, for instance, requires that 
member nations impose a value-added tax (VAT) of at least 15 percent. The EU also 
has harmonized tax rates for fuel, alcohol, and tobacco, and there are ongoing efforts to 
harmonize the taxation of personal and corporate income tax rates.  
- Implicit harmonization occurs when governments tax the income their citizens 
earn in other jurisdictions. This policy of “worldwide taxation” requires governments to 
collect financial information on nonresident investors and to share that information with 
tax collectors from foreign governments. This “information exchange” system tends to 
be a one-way street since jobs and capital generally flow from high-tax nations to low-
tax nations. Under this indirect form of tax harmonization, just as under the direct form 
outlined above, taxpayers are unable to benefit from better tax policy in other nations, 
and governments are insulated from market discipline. 
Both forms of tax harmonization have similarly counterproductive economic 
consequences. In each case, tax competition is emasculated, encouraging higher tax 
rates. This hinders the efficient allocation of capital and labor, slowing overall 
economic performance. 
Table no. 1  Tax revenue by main tax categories, % of GDP 




 Tax  rate 
% GDP 
Countries Tax  rate 
% GDP 
Countries Tax  rate  % 
GDP 
Countries 
1. Min rate  11,5  LT 6,1  BG, SK 1,1  DK 
2. Av. rate  13,8  EU27 12,8  EU27 13  EU27 
3. Max rate  19  BG 31,2  DK 16,4 FR 
Diff. (3)-(1)  7,5    25,1    15,3   











harmonization and tax 
competition 
Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Tax harmonization can be carried out in the following components of 
taxation:
16 
1. Harmonization of an object of taxation - occur as an imperative prescription 
that member states all must tax a specified object, in the case under discussion, 
corporate profits. 
                                                      
16 Lithuanian Free Market Institute, (2006), “Harmonization of the Corporate Tax Base in the 
European Union”, Analytical Study, http://www.freema.org  
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2. Harmonization of a tax base - regulation is laid down for principles and rules 
which are applied to calculating the tax base. 
3. Harmonization of the rules of tax payment - regulation is set for payment of 
the corporate tax. Harmonization of tax payment rules is usually combined with 
harmonization of a tax base and rates. 
4. Harmonization of a tax rate. In this case a minimal (uniform or maximal) tax 
rate is fixed. If harmonization of a tax rate is implemented separate from harmonization 
of a tax base, this is also called nominal harmonization. 
Concerning the strategies of harmonization there are two solutions (Tulai & 
Serbu, 2005): 
1. harmonization through market; 
2. negotiated harmonization. 
If fiscal system harmonization at EU level was regarded with hostility for a 
long time because of state sovereignty now it is necessary for avoiding all fiscal barriers 
for the Common Market. The different options for harmonization are due to national 
different fiscal policies that are adopted for the member states.  
It can be expected that the welfare effects of tax harmonization will be 
unequally distributed, both over countries and over interest groups within countries. 
Large countries tend to benefit more from tax harmonization than small countries. Since 
large countries have certain advantages over small countries, they can impose higher 
taxes and yet remain competitive. Enterprises in small countries more often need to 
cross borders if they want to expand their activities than companies in large countries. 
Moreover, companies in a small country have fewer opportunities for loss 
compensation and depreciation relief than enterprises in a large country (Hoek, 2004). 
5. TAX COMPETITION – A PANEL ANALYSIS FOR EU COUNTRIES 
Using the panel methodology through a multiple regression with estimation by 
random effects we try to demonstrate some hypotheses that reveals the main arguments 
favorable for tax competition. Based on the hypotheses demonstrated in our model we 
can affirm that the best solution for European Union is harmonization for indirect taxes 
and competition for direct taxes.  
Tax competition is necessary in the future tax policy of EU as while as tax 
competition is under some macroeconomic constraints as budget deficit and public 
debt. We can appreciate that this constrains are more efficient than other solution for 
eliminating and combating so called harmful tax competition.  
Our analysis is for a period of ten years, based on annual data. The dependent 
variable is implicit tax rate of capital and business income. We introduce control 
variable - public expenditures as percentage of GDP. We estimate the impact of budget 
deficit and public debt on the tax burden of capital in a standard random effects model. 
This article analyzes 27 countries, EU members in the present, for 1995-2004 periods. 
 We have taking into consideration all 27 countries even in that period weren’t 
all EU members, but for our study is important especially for predicted what it would 
be in the future and taking into account the major differences between the old and the 
new member states. 
Our start point was the study of Winner (2005), which made a similar model for 
OECD countries We try to develop a specific model for EU taking into account the 
present day of EU countries, who are engaged in a race of tax competition under 
unequal starting conditions. Unequal conditions means that although all EMU and  
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prospective EMU Member States have to satisfy the two conditions of the stability pact 
(i.e. public debt lower than 60% of GDP and budget deficit lower than 3% of GDP) 
they do not start from equal starting positions concerning public debt and budget deficit 
(Halkos & Kyriazis, 2006) 
   This study try to reveal the impact of the two major constraints that have to 
accomplish EU members (3% for budget deficit and 60% for public debt as a ratio to 
GDP) on the degree of tax competition in which can be involved every EU member 
state. Two hypotheses are demonstrated by this study: 
H1: Budget deficit limit the degree of tax competition manifestation. 
H2: Public debt and public expenses are correlated with the degree of tax 
competition manifestation. 
These hypotheses are verified using the next equation for the model: 
(1) ITRit=c0+c1BD+c2PD+c3GDPC+c4OP+c5UES+c6CONSGDP+c7EGR 
In the next table we are presenting the results: 








BD (Budget deficit)  0.27** 
(0.01) 
PD (Public debt)  -0.06** 
(0.01) 
GDPC (GDP per capita)  0.23** 
(0.01) 
OP (Openness)  -0.06*** 
(0.000) 
UES (Country area as percentage of EU area)    -0.22 
(0.53) 




EGR (Economic Growth Rate)  -0.10 
(0.37) 
Number of observations  203 
R2  0,81 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. Significant at 1%; Significant at 5%; Significant at 
10%; 
We consider as indicator for evaluating the tax burden, the effective tax rate, 
calculated as a ratio between the effective tax and the tax base. At the European Union 
level data about the effective tax rate are very scarcely and in this case we choose an 
Eurostat indicator: implicit tax rate an capital and business income calculated as a 
ratio between the effective tax on capital and business income and the effective tax 
base, taking into account all deductions or exemptions.  
The independent variables used by the model are presented below: 
DB (Budget deficit) - As a percentage of GDP, is the main constraint in front 
of tax competition (Eurostat). 
DP (Public debt) - For covering the budget deficit every country has two main 
solutions: raising the taxation or rising debt ratio. If the debt ratio is increase we are  
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expected to have a lower taxation on the short time but in the long time the public debt 
it will be covered from rising taxation, and we can say that public debt is a delayed tax 
for contributors (Eurostat). 
GDPC  (GDP per Capita) - It is an important difference between the old 
member states which have a high GDP per capita comparative with the new member 
and we expect to obtain some correlation between this variable and evolution of tax 
burden, implicitly the manifestation of tax competition  (Penn World Table). 
UES (Country area) - Area of every member states as percentage of total EU 
area ( Wikipedia). 
CONSGDP Consumption as percentage of GDP (Penn World Table). 
OP - Openness is used as a proxy for capital mobility, the main factor which is 
favorable for tax competition. Is calculated as a ratio between the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP(Penn World Table). 
EGR  - Economic Growth Rate (Penn World Table).  




Is the most significant variable and is direct correlated with the implicit tax rate and 
also with the tax competition. If one country have a high budget deficit, which is bigger than 
3% from GDP it is very difficult for that country to engage in the tax competition race. One unit 
change in budget deficit is follow by 0.31 unit change in the same direction of implicit tax rate 
on capital and business income (from the first equation).  
Public debt  It is a significant variable but the correlation is not so powerful like with budget deficit 
and the correlation is indirect because in most of the cases the budget deficit is covered by 
public debt and only after that by rising taxes. When taxes raising the public debt are lower 
and vice versa. From our study we can see that for countries like Italy, Greece, Belgium is 
difficult to engage in the tax competition because the level of their public debt is double for the 
level required by the EU.  
GDP per 
Capita 
It is significant variable only in the first three equations, the correlation is direct, and 
this confirm that we can see from descriptive analysis that the new members state which have 
a lower GDP per capita are more engaged in the tax competition comparative with the old 
members states (EU 15).  
Country 
area 
The same situation like for the Population variable.  
Openness  This variable is significant correlated with tax competition because is a proxy for 
capital mobility which is an important factor in tax competition developing. If the capital mobility 
is very high there is the possibility to choose the jurisdiction with a lower taxation and this lead 
to reduce tax burden through tax competition.  
Note: The others variables (Consumption as percentage of GDP, Economic Growth Rate)    
have an insignificant correlation 
 
From this empirical study we may conclude that the future of EU tax policy is 
based not only tax harmonization, but also on tax competition. The fight for combating 
the harmful tax competition is welcome but has to be done with the proper instruments 
and we consider that the satisfying the two conditions of the stability pact (i.e. public 
debt lower than 60% of GDP and budget deficit lower than 3% of GDP)are the best 
instruments for limiting the harmful tax competition. 
Conclusions 
To summarize the EU initiatives on tax harmonization, only the VAT rates and 
the excise duties have achieved a high degree of harmonization with the establishment  
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of the Single Market and the abolition of intra-Community tax controls. Apart from the 
VAT and the excise duties, the indirect taxes may be harmonized following the article 
93 EC Treaty and therefore help preventing double taxation, tax avoidance and 
disturbing of tax competition.  
Some level of coordination is needed in the area of company taxation; however, 
the Commission proposed a common tax base for European companies without fixed 
rates, aimed in the long term at a harmonized European corporate tax base. The 
Commission proposal of the Home State Taxation scheme would be based on mutual 
recognition of the Member States’ tax rules and tax coordination. European 
coordination may help to avoid tax revenue losses as the capital is mobile across EU 
countries 
The personal income tax and the tax on dividends of individuals should stay 
under each Member State’s national rules. According to the Court of Justice, in the 
absence of the EU harmonization, the personal income taxation shall be safeguarded as 
each Member State’s national policy. In addition, general and final provisions of the EC 
Treaty abolish under article 293, double taxation within the Community and encourage 
the respect of the rights of individuals in cross-border situations.  .   
Due to a “race to the bottom” taxes on capital income might no longer 
contribute sufficiently to the financing of public expenditure and it might become 
difficult or even impossible for governments to perform their usual tasks. An under 
supply of public goods and/or an erosion of the welfare state are feared to be the 
outcome of tax competition.  
At the very least, the tax burden might be shifted away from highly mobile 
capital towards immobile factors such as labour; this would raise labour costs and 
impede the reduction of unemployment especially in Western Europe. The 
harmonization of tax rates is thought to be the remedy at least for indirect taxes. 
EU member states participating in EMU have given up the possibility of an 
independent monetary policy. Therefore, they have fewer policy options, so they might 
have incentives to use taxes to achieve competitive advantages, which may intensify tax 
competition. The conclusion is that every EU member states have a different degree of 
tax competition and this degree is limited by the EU requires concerning the budget 
deficit which have not exceed 3% of GDP and 60% for public debt. 
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